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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 From the Protestant-Catholic school wars of the mid-1800s to the 
prosecution of Amish parents in the 1960s and home schooling par-
ents in the 1980s, societal rules enacted by the government have 
clashed with the conscientiously motivated activities of religious be-
lievers. Perhaps the greatest area of conflict between government 
regulation and religious belief is in the context of public school edu-
cation.1 States undoubtedly have a strong interest in providing a 
public school education to their citizens. As the Supreme Court has 
stated, “Providing public schools ranks at the very apex of the func-
tion of a State.”2 The state’s interest in this regard, however, “is not 
                                                                                                                     
 * J.D., Florida State University College of Law, 2006; B.A., University of Tampa, 
2003. I am extremely grateful to Professor Steve Gey for suggesting this topic and provid-
ing valuable feedback on earlier drafts. Special thanks to Mark Scott, Todd Messinger, and 
Megan Menagh for all of their editing work. All errors are my own. 
 1.  See, e.g., Crystal V. Hodgson, Coercion in the Classroom: The Inherent Tension 
Between the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses in the Context of Evolution, 9 NEXUS 
171, 171 (2004) (“Courts have effectively taken teacher-led prayer out of public schools, 
have prohibited Bible reading in the classroom, have prohibited the requirement of the 
posting of the Ten Commandments in public classrooms, have prohibited non-
denominational prayers at graduation ceremonies, and have forbidden the display of reli-
gious holiday decorations in public buildings.” (footnotes omitted)); Donna Marie Werner, 
Comment, Ware v. Valley Stream High School District: At What Expense Should Religious 
Freedoms Be Preserved?, 64 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 347, 348-49 (1990) (“The public school arena 
is fertile ground for religion clause debate.”). 
 2. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213 (1972).  
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totally free from a balancing process when it impinges on fundamen-
tal rights and interests, such as those specifically protected by the 
Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, and the traditional in-
terest of parents with respect to the religious upbringing of their 
children.”3 Thus, in some instances the state’s interest in providing 
public education must yield to those individual interests and rights 
deemed by the Court to be fundamental.  
 This Comment addresses situations in which individual interests 
and rights outweigh a state’s interest in providing education. This 
Comment will first examine the question of whether the Constitution 
or state Religious and Freedom Restoration Acts (RFRAs) require 
states to grant opt-out provisions to the children of parents who find 
certain public school curricula religiously offensive. For instance, can 
parents who believe in creationism require the school to grant their 
child an opt-out of a biology class that teaches evolution? After ad-
dressing whether a state can be forced to provide an opt-out, this 
Comment will next consider if granting an opt-out, whether pursuant 
to the Constitution or by the state’s own free will, violates the Estab-
lishment Clause of the First Amendment. Thus, this Comment exam-
ines both the question of whether an opt-out is legally required and 
also whether an opt-out is constitutionally prohibited.  
 Part II of this Comment explores various claims that may be 
raised in arguing for an opt-out provision. Such claims include a Free 
Exercise Clause challenge, a “hybrid claim,” and a state RFRA ac-
tion. Part III addresses whether a state is permitted to provide an 
opt-out or whether such a concession would be a violation of the Es-
tablishment Clause. Part IV offers concluding remarks. 
II.   THE RIGHT TO OPT OUT 
A.   The Free Exercise Clause 
1.   The Free Exercise Standard 
 The Free Exercise Clause, made applicable to the states by incor-
poration into the Fourteenth Amendment,4 provides that “Congress 
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohib-
iting the free exercise thereof.”5 The Free Exercise Clause excludes all 
“governmental regulation of religious beliefs as such.”6 The govern-
ment cannot compel affirmation of religious belief,7 punish adherents 
                                                                                                                     
 3. Id. at 214.  
 4. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).  
 5. U.S. CONST. amend. I (emphasis added).  
 6. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990) (citing Sherbert v. Verner, 
374 U.S. 398, 402 (1963)).  
 7. See Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961).  
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of religions it believes to be false,8 lend its power to one side in reli-
gious controversies,9 or impose special disabilities based upon reli-
gious status or views.10 
 “[T]he Free Exercise Clause is written in terms of what the gov-
ernment cannot do to the individual, not in terms of what the individ-
ual can exact from the government.”11 As such, the Constitution does 
not require public schools to delete from the curriculum all materials 
that may be religiously offensive.12 Thus, “while the Free Exercise 
clause protects, to a degree, an individual’s right to practice her relig-
ion within the dictates of her conscience, it does not convene on an in-
dividual the right to dictate a school’s curriculum to conform to her re-
ligion.”13 While the Free Exercise Clause may not allow a student to 
change a school’s curriculum, the question still remains as to whether 
a student may opt out of a particular class. Such a request would im-
pose at least a minimal burden on the school but would fall short of ac-
tually dictating to the school the curriculum to be taught.  
 In Sherbert v. Verner,14 the Supreme Court addressed a free exer-
cise claim by a member of the Seventh-day Adventist Church who 
was discharged by her employer because she refused to work on Sat-
urday.15 After being discharged, Sherbert sought to obtain unem-
ployment benefits, but she was denied on the grounds that she had 
failed “without good cause . . . to accept available suitable work when 
offered.”16 Sherbert brought suit claming this action violated her free 
exercise right under the First Amendment.17  
 In evaluating her claim, the Court put forth a two-prong free ex-
ercise test. For plaintiffs to succeed on a free exercise challenge, they 
must show that (1) the government regulation placed a burden on the 
free exercise of religion, and (2) the government lacks a “compelling 
state interest” in regulating the burdening activity.18 In applying the 
first prong, the Court found that the regulation burdened Sherbert’s 
                                                                                                                     
 8. United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86-88 (1944).  
 9. Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 708-25 (1976); Presby-
terian Church in the U.S. v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l Presbyterian Church, 393 
U.S. 440, 445-52 (1969); Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 95-119 (1952).  
 10. See McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978); Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67, 
69 (1953).  
 11. Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 451 (1988) (quoting 
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 412 (1963)). As Justice Douglas stated, “The fact that 
government cannot exact from me a surrender of one iota of my religious scruples does not, 
of course, mean that I can demand of government a sum of money, the better to exercise 
them.” Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 412 (Douglas, J., concurring).  
 12. Florey v. Sioux Falls Sch. Dist. 49-5, 619 F.2d 1311, 1318 (8th Cir. 1980). 
 13. Bauchman v. W. High Sch., 132 F.3d 542, 557 (10th Cir. 1997). 
 14. 374 U.S. 398.  
 15. Id. at 399.  
 16. Id. at 401 (citing S.C. CODE  § 68-114(3) (1962)). 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. at 403.  
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free exercise of religion.19 While noting that no criminal sanction di-
rectly compelled her to work on Saturday, the Court stated that a 
burden can be established by indirect compulsion: “ ‘[I]f the purpose 
or effect of a law is to impede the observance of one or all religions, 
that law is constitutionally invalid even though the burden may be 
characterized as being only indirect.’ ”20 In describing the burden 
placed on Sherbert, the Court opined: “The [lower court’s] ruling 
forces her to choose between following the precepts of her religion 
and forfeiting benefits, on the one hand, and abandoning one of the 
precepts of her religion in order to accept work, on the other hand.”21 
The Court held that such an imposition was analogous to imposing a 
fine on Sherbert for worshipping on Saturday.22 
 With respect to the second prong, the state argued that there 
was a compelling state interest in disallowing unemployment bene-
fits in this situation.23 According to the state, granting employment 
benefits under this situation would lead to fraudulent claims being 
filed, which would lead to the depletion of the unemployment fund 
and “hinder the scheduling by employers of necessary Saturday 
work.”24 The Court rejected this argument because it had not been 
raised in the lower court.25 The Court went on, however, to discredit 
the state’s argument: “For even if the possibility of spurious claims 
did threaten to dilute the fund and disrupt the scheduling of work, 
it would plainly be incumbent upon [the employers and employment 
commission] to demonstrate that no alternative forms of regulation 
would combat such abuses without infringing First Amendment 
rights.”26 Therefore, according to the Court, the state had unconsti-
tutionally infringed upon the First Amendment right to the free ex-
ercise of religion.27 
                                                                                                                     
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. at 404 (quoting Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 607 (1961)).  
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. at 406-07.  
 24. Id. at 407. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. The Court also noted that “before the instant decision, state supreme courts 
had, without exception, granted benefits to persons who were physically available for work 
but unable to find suitable employment solely because of a religious prohibition against 
Saturday work.” Id. at 408 n.7. 
 27. Id. at 409. The Court also claimed that such a holding did not violate the Estab-
lishment Clause: 
In holding as we do, plainly we are not fostering the “establishment” of the Sev-
enth-day Adventist religion in South Carolina, for the extension of unemploy-
ment benefits to Sabbatarians in common with Sunday worshippers reflects noth-
ing more than the governmental obligation of neutrality in the face of religious 
differences, and does not represent that involvement of religious with secular in-
stitutions which it is the object of the Establishment Clause to forestall. 
Id. In a concurring opinion, however, Justice Stewart took issue with this claim, stating 
that such a holding violated the Establishment Clause as the Court had construed it in 
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 In Mozert v. Hawkins County Board of Education,28 the Sixth Cir-
cuit applied the Sherbert standard in the context of public school cur-
ricula. There, parents of school children brought suit against the 
school board for its use of the Holt, Rinehart, and Winston basic 
reading series (the “Holt Series”), which discussed various types of 
religions.29 The parents claimed that forcing students “to read school 
books which teach or inculcate values in violation of their religious 
beliefs and convictions is a clear violation of their rights to the free 
exercise of religion.”30 
 In addressing the first prong of the Sherbert test, the court held 
that the school district’s use of the Holt Series did not burden the 
free exercise of religion. According to the court, the school district’s 
action did not require one to affirm or deny a religious belief or re-
quire or prohibit one from engaging in the practice of religion.31 The 
court stressed that no free exercise violation had occurred, because 
the Holt Series had merely exposed the plaintiffs to differing views of 
religion: “ ‘[D]istinctions must be drawn between those governmental 
actions that actually interfere with the exercise of religion, and those 
that merely require or result in exposure to attitudes and outlooks at 
odds with perspectives prompted by religion.’ ”32 In holding that no 
burden had been placed on the free exercise of religion, the court was 
not required to determine whether the state had shown a compelling 
interest.33 
 The question arises, however, as to whether a court would employ 
the standard enumerated in Sherbert or the more onerous free exercise 
standard articulated by the Supreme Court in Employment Division v. 
Smith.34 In Smith, the respondents were fired from their jobs because 
they had used peyote, a hallucinogen, for religious purposes at a cere-
mony of their Native American Church.35 Thereafter, the respondents 
applied to the Employment Division for unemployment benefits, but 
were denied under a finding that they had been discharged for em-
ployment-related “misconduct.”36 The respondents brought suit claim-
ing this denial of benefits violated their free exercise rights.37  
                                                                                                                     
previous cases. Id. at 413. (Stewart, J., concurring). This issue will be addressed in Part 
III, infra.  
 28. 827 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1987).  
 29. Id. at 1060, 1062. 
 30. Id. at 1061.  
 31. Id. at 1069.  
 32. Id. at 1068 (quoting Grove v. Mead Sch. Dist. No. 354, 753 F.2d 1528, 1543 (9th 
Cir. 1985)). 
 33. Id. at 1070.  
 34. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).  
 35. Id. at 874.  
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
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 Under Smith, a state would be “ ‘prohibiting the free exercise [of 
religion]’ if it sought to ban such acts or abstentions only when they 
are engaged in for religious reasons, or only because of the religious 
belief that they display.”38 Rather than apply strict scrutiny, the 
Court “held that the right of free exercise does not relieve an individ-
ual of the obligation to comply with a ‘valid and neutral law of gen-
eral applicability on the ground that the law proscribes (or pre-
scribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or proscribes).’ ”39 Thus, 
after Smith, courts must apply rational basis review to neutral laws 
of general applicability. The Court did, however, recognize limited 
exceptions under which strict scrutiny would still be applicable. For 
instance, the Court distinguished the Sherbert balancing test by not-
ing that it “was developed in a context that lent itself to individual-
ized governmental assessment of the reasons for the relevant con-
duct.”40 Additionally, the Court recognized that strict scrutiny would 
still apply in the context of a hybrid claim.41 This hybrid exception 
will be discussed in detail in Part II.B. 
2.   Applying the Free Exercise Standard to Public School         
Curricula 
 The success of a free exercise challenge in the context of public 
school curricula depends largely on the standard the court employs. 
Application of the Sherbert/Mozert standard would provide some 
hope for plaintiffs, whereas application of the Smith standard would 
invariably foreclose any chance of a successful free exercise claim. 
Some commentators have suggested that the Court would not apply 
Smith in the public school context: “The Smith standard, however, is 
not likely to be applied to a claim arising in the public school context. 
Other more pertinent standards, similar to the principles set out in 
Mozert, are more likely to apply.”42 This statement, however, seems 
somewhat dubious.  
                                                                                                                     
 38. Id. at 877 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. I).  
 39. Id. at 879 (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982) (Stevens, J., 
concurring)). 
 40. Id. at 884 (quoting Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 708 (1986)). 
 41. Id. at 881. 
The only decisions in which we have held that the First Amendment bars ap-
plication of a neutral, generally applicable law to religiously motivated action 
have involved not the Free Exercise Clause alone, but the Free Exercise Clause 
in conjunction with other constitutional protections, such as freedom of speech 
and of the press . . . or the right of parents, acknowledged in Pierce v. Society of 
Sisters, . . . to direct the education of their children. 
Id. (citation omitted). 
 42. Gabriel Acri, Comment, Persistent Monkey on the Back of the American Public 
Education System: A Study of the Continued Debate over the Teaching of Creationism and 
Evolution, 41 CATH. LAW 39, 63 (2001).  
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 In Vandiver v. Hardin County Board of Education,43 the Sixth 
Circuit—the same circuit that decided Mozert—reviewed a post-Smith 
free exercise challenge to the public school curricula. The court held 
that Smith——a case addressing a criminal statute—applied equally 
to neutral civil statutes of general applicability.44 The court held 
“that the Supreme Court would not ‘have been as concerned as it was 
to distinguish and explain numerous previous free exercise cases 
that address ‘civil’ statutes’ were the Smith holding limited to the 
criminal context alone.”45 After holding that Smith applied in the 
public school curricula context, the court noted that the public school 
curricula law in question was a neutral law of general applicability; 
therefore, any “free exercise challenge [was] presumably precluded.”46 
 The Vandiver decision is important for two reasons. First, it es-
sentially dismisses any argument that Mozert, rather than Smith, 
would be applied in the context of public school curricula. Had Smith 
not essentially overruled Mozert, the Sixth Circuit surely would have 
applied its own binding case law in Vandiver. The Sixth Circuit’s 
failure to even mention Mozert and its application of Smith, shows 
that Smith governs a free exercise claim in the context of public 
school curricula. Second, Vandiver illustrates that any free exercise 
challenge to a law regulating a public school curricula is “presumably 
precluded” as these are neutral laws of general applicability. It would 
be hard to imagine a law regulating a public school curricula that 
was not. Therefore, a free exercise challenge, standing alone, would 
be unsuccessful.  
B.   Hybrid Claims 
1. The Free Exercise Clause and Parental Right Hybrid Standard  
 Based on the foregoing, it seems almost certain that any free exer-
cise challenge to a law regulating public school curricula would be 
bound to fail. Nevertheless, plaintiffs in the public school context 
have a stronger claim at their disposal. In Smith, the Supreme Court 
noted an exception to the onerous standard articulated in that case.47 
                                                                                                                     
 43. 925 F.2d 927 (6th Cir. 1991).  
 44. Id. at 932. Other circuits have held the same. See Salvation Army v. Dep’t of 
Cmty. Affairs, 919 F.2d 183 (3d Cir. 1990) (holding that a family center for disadvantaged 
persons was not exempt from a state statute regulating boarding houses); St. Bartholo-
mew’s Church v. City of New York, 914 F.2d 348 (2d Cir. 1990) (holding that a religious or-
ganization was not exempt from compliance with a facially neutral landmark preservation 
law).  
 45. Vandiver, 925 F.2d at 932 (quoting Salvation Army, 919 F.2d at 195). 
 46. Id. After holding that the free exercise challenge was precluded, the court went on 
to address the hybrid exception noted in Smith. See id. at 933.  
 47. See supra note 41.  
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This exception—known as a “hybrid claim”—would provide plaintiffs 
in the public school context with a greater likelihood of success.  
 The hybrid claim was first articulated in Wisconsin v. Yoder.48 In 
Yoder, the Supreme Court addressed a claim brought by Amish par-
ents challenging Wisconsin’s compulsory school attendance law.49 
The parents were members of Old Order Amish communities, which 
did not permit children to be sent to high school.50 As a result of this 
religious belief, the parents withheld their children from high school 
and were subsequently tried and convicted for violating the afore-
mentioned law.51 In challenging the law, the parents claimed that, by 
sending their children to high school, they would expose themselves 
to reprimand from the church and also compromise their salvation 
and that of their children.52 The state stipulated that these religious 
beliefs were sincere.53 
 In addressing the constitutional challenge, the Court stated that, 
for the law to be upheld, it must be shown that the state did not deny 
the free exercise of religion by this requirement or that there is a 
state interest sufficient to override the free exercise challenge.54 The 
Court held that the Wisconsin law violated the Free Exercise Clause 
because it “affirmatively compel[led the parents], under threat of 
criminal sanction, to perform acts undeniably at odds with funda-
mental tenets of their religious beliefs.”55  
 Having determined that the Wisconsin law burdened the free ex-
ercise of religion, the Court went on to examine the state’s contention 
of a compelling government interest. The state made two arguments 
in this regard. First, the state argued that education is intrical to 
prepare people to participate in the political system that is necessary 
in an independent and free society.56 Second, the state argued that 
education is necessary to ensure that individuals are self-sufficient 
                                                                                                                     
 48. 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
 49. Id. at 207.  
 50. Id. at 207, 209. 
 51. Id. at 208.  
 52. Id. at 209.  
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. at 214.  
 55. Id. at 218. The Court further stated that the law threatened the continued exis-
tence of the Amish community. Id. The Court also observed: 
Nor is the impact of the compulsory-attendance law confined to grave interfer-
ence with important Amish religious tenets from a subjective point of view. It 
carries with it precisely the kind of objective danger to the free exercise of relig-
ion that the First Amendment was designed to prevent. As the record shows, 
compulsory school attendance to age [sixteen] for Amish children carries with it 
a very real threat of undermining the Amish community and religious practice 
as they exist today; they must either abandon belief and be assimilated into so-
ciety at large, or be forced to migrate to some other and more tolerant region. 
Id.  
 56. Id. at 221.  
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and self-reliant.57 The Court dismissed these interests, claiming that, 
with respect to the Amish, an additional one or two years of formal 
education would do little to serve the purported state interests.58 
 The Court then went on to discuss the hybrid nature of the claim. 
The Court stated that the case “involve[d] the fundamental interest of 
parents . . . to guide the religious future and education of their chil-
dren.”59 As such, the Court held that strict scrutiny was appropriate in 
evaluating the Wisconsin law: “[W]hen the interests of parenthood are 
combined with a free exercise claim of the nature revealed by this re-
cord, more than merely a ‘reasonable relation to some purpose within 
the competency of the State’ is required to sustain the validity of the 
State’s requirement under the First Amendment.”60 
 As the Smith and Yoder Courts explained, a hybrid claim is a free 
exercise claim coupled with another constitutional protection. In the 
context of challenging public school curricula, that other constitu-
tional protection would be the parental right articulated by the Su-
preme Court in Meyer v. Nebraska61 and Pierce v. Society of Sisters.62 
As the free exercise standard was discussed in Part II.A.1, the re-
mainder of this Part will address the parental right articulated in 
Meyer and Pierce.  
 In Meyer, a teacher was tried and convicted under a Nebraska law 
that criminalized teaching a foreign language.63 In reversing the con-
viction and overturning the law, the Court stated, “[I]t is the natural 
duty of the parent to give his children education suitable to their sta-
tion in life . . . .”64 Two years later the Court decided Pierce. There, 
the Court considered the constitutionality of an Oregon law that re-
quired parents to send their children to public schools.65 Relying on 
                                                                                                                     
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 222. 
[T]he evidence adduced by the Amish in this case is persuasively to the effect 
that an additional one or two years of formal high school for Amish children in 
place of their long-established program of informal vocational education would 
do little to serve those interests. Respondents’ experts testified at trial, without 
challenge, that the value of all education must be assessed in terms of its ca-
pacity to prepare the child for life. It is one thing to say that compulsory educa-
tion for a year or two beyond the eighth grade may be necessary when its goal 
is the preparation of the child for life in modern society as the majority live, but 
it is quite another if the goal of education be viewed as the preparation of the 
child for life in the separated agrarian community that is the keystone of the 
Amish faith. 
Id.  
 59. Id. at 232. 
 60. Id. at 233 (quoting Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925)). 
 61. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).  
 62. 268 U.S. 510.  
 63. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 396-97.  
 64. Id. at 400.  
 65. Pierce, 268 U.S. at 530-31.  
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Meyer, the Court held that the law “unreasonably interfere[d] with 
the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and 
education of children under their control.”66 As the Court noted, “The 
child is not the mere creature of the State; those who nurture him 
and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to 
recognize and prepare him for additional obligations.”67 
2.   Applying the Hybrid Standard to Public School Curricula  
 Plaintiffs putting forth a hybrid claim in the public school curric-
ula context have, by and large, been unsuccessful. Courts have se-
verely limited Yoder to the unique facts of that case.68 The Yoder 
Court explicitly limited its holding to “a free exercise claim of the na-
ture revealed by [the] record”69 and “one that probably few other reli-
gious groups or sects could make.”70  
 In addition, the Second Circuit has refused to even consider a hy-
brid claim, arguing that the language in Smith was dicta and there-
fore nonbinding.71 Similarly, the Sixth Circuit has refused to follow 
Smith’s hybrid exception until the Supreme Court clarifies its state-
ment.72 Despite the Second and Sixth Circuits’ refusal to follow 
Smith’s hybrid exception, the First,73 Ninth,74 Tenth,75 and D.C.76 Cir-
cuits, by contrast, have followed the Supreme Court’s hybrid analysis 
as enumerated in Smith.  
 In Brown v. Hot, Sexy and Safer Productions, Inc.,77 the plaintiffs 
alleged that they were compelled to attend an indecent sex education 
course conducted at their high school by Hot, Sexy and Safer Produc-
tions.78 Plaintiffs alleged many constitutional violations, and among 
                                                                                                                     
 66. Id. at 534-35.  
 67. Id. at 535. 
 68. See, e.g., Mozert v. Hawkins County Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058, 1067 (6th Cir. 
1987) (“Yoder rested on such a singular set of facts that we do not believe it can be held to 
announce a general rule . . . .”); Blackwelder v. Safnauer, 689 F. Supp. 106, 135 (N.D.N.Y. 
1988) (“[T]he holding in Yoder must be limited to its unique facts.”). 
 69. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 233 (1972). 
 70. Id. at 236.  
 71. See Leebaert v. Harrington, 332 F.3d 134, 143 (2d Cir. 2003).  
 72. Kissinger v. Bd. of Trs., 5 F.3d 177, 180-81 (6th Cir. 1993) (holding that the hybrid 
rights exception will apply if a free exercise claim is joined with another independently vi-
able substantive due process claim). 
 73. Brown v. Hot, Sexy & Safer Prods., Inc., 68 F.3d 525, 538-39 (1st Cir. 1995) (hold-
ing that the hybrid rights exception was prevented without an independently viable claim). 
 74. Miller v. Reed, 176 F.3d 1202, 1208 (9th Cir. 1999) (applying Smith outside the 
criminal context).  
 75. Swanson v. Guthrie Indep. Sch. Dist. No. I-L, 135 F.3d 694, 699-700 (10th Cir. 
1998) (applying a “colorable claim of infringement” theory to implement the hybrid rights 
exception). 
 76. EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455, 467 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (holding that the 
addition of an Establishment Clause violation establishes a hybrid rights exception). 
 77. 68 F.3d 525. 
 78. Id. at 529.  
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those was a Smith hybrid claim based on a free exercise challenge 
and a violation of the parental right established in Meyer and 
Pierce.79 The First Circuit, however, never analyzed the hybrid right. 
Rather, the court held that the parents had not shown a violation of 
the Meyer and Pierce parental right, and therefore no hybrid claim 
was properly alleged. According to the court, the Meyer and Pierce 
right does not “encompass[ ]  a fundamental constitutional right to 
dictate the curricula at the public school to which [parents] have cho-
sen to send their children.”80 The court elaborated on this holding: 
“We think it is fundamentally different for the state to say to a par-
ent, ‘You can’t teach your child German or send him to a parochial 
school,’ than for the parent to say to the state, ‘You can’t teach my 
child subjects that are morally offensive to me.’ ”81 In so holding, the 
court summarily dismissed the hybrid claim stating: “Their free ex-
ercise challenge is . . . not conjoined with an independently protected 
constitutional protection.”82  
 Likewise, other courts have summarily dismissed the hybrid 
claim, arguing that a Meyer and Pierce violation was not shown.83 
These courts have essentially held that Meyer and Pierce do not pro-
vide parents with the right to have their children opt out of offensive 
public school curricula. As the Brown court stated:  
If all parents had a fundamental constitutional right to dictate in-
dividually what the schools teach their children, the schools would 
be forced to cater a curriculum for each student whose parents had 
genuine moral disagreements with the school’s choice of subject 
matter. We cannot see that the Constitution imposes such a bur-
den on state educational systems, and accordingly find that the 
rights of parents as described by Meyer and Pierce do not encom-
pass a broad-based right to restrict the flow of information in the 
public schools.84 
 If you believe the cases cited above, a hybrid claim in the context 
of public school curricula would, like a free exercise claim, undoubt-
edly fail. Yet, these cases seem to be selling the Meyer and Pierce 
                                                                                                                     
 79. Id. at 539.  
 80. Id. at 533.  
 81. Id. at 533-34.  
 82. Id. at 539.  
 83. See Swanson v. Guthrie Indep. Sch. Dist. No. I-L, 135 F.3d 694, 700 (10th Cir. 
1998) (“Whatever the Smith hybrid-rights theory may ultimately mean, we believe that it 
at least requires a colorable showing of infringement of recognized and specific constitu-
tional rights, rather than the mere invocation of a general right such as the right to control 
the education of one’s child.”); see also Miller v. Reed, 176 F.3d 1202, 1208 (9th Cir. 1999) 
(“We hold that a plaintiff does not allege a hybrid-rights claim entitled to strict scrutiny 
analysis merely by combining a free exercise claim with an utterly meritless claim of the 
violation of another alleged fundamental right or a claim of an alleged violation of a non-
fundamental or non-existent right.”).  
 84. Brown, 68 F.3d at 534.  
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holdings short. In essence, these courts are saying that Meyer means 
only that parents can choose to teach their child a foreign language 
and that Pierce means simply that parents can send their child to a 
private, rather than public, school.85  
 This limited interpretation of the holdings in Meyer and Pierce 
completely ignores the Supreme Court’s prior treatment of those 
cases. Rather than treating Meyer and Pierce as limited to the spe-
cific facts of those cases, the Supreme Court has stated that those 
cases articulated “broad statements of the substantive reach of lib-
erty under the Due Process Clause.”86 Moreover, a limited view of the 
reach of those holdings completely ignores the Court’s decision in 
Yoder. As the Yoder court stated, “The duty to prepare the child for 
‘additional obligations,’ referred to by the [Meyer] Court, must be 
read to include the inculcation of moral standards, religious beliefs, 
and elements of good citizenship.”87 Additionally, Yoder did not deal 
with sending children to a private school or the teaching of a foreign 
language, yet the Supreme Court found it within the bounds of con-
stitutional law to apply those holdings to the entirely different facts 
of that case. Thus, the limited view of the Meyer and Pierce holdings 
articulated by the circuit courts is completely unfounded and without 
support in Supreme Court jurisprudence.88 
 Assuming that a court could be convinced that Meyer and Pierce 
do provide a broad parental right sufficient to successfully plead a 
hybrid claim, a strict scrutiny test would be applicable, and the ques-
tion would turn to whether, under a Sherbert analysis, an opt-out 
would be required.89 The Sherbert analysis requires that (1) the gov-
ernment regulation placed a burden on the free exercise of religion, 
                                                                                                                     
 85. See id. at 533 (“The Meyer and Pierce cases, we think, evince the principle that the 
state cannot prevent parents from choosing a specific educational program—whether it be 
religious instruction at a private school or instruction in a foreign language.”). 
 86. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 564 (2003).  
 87. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 233 (1972) (emphasis added).  
 88. To be clear, this Comment does not maintain that Meyer and Pierce, alone, provide 
parents with the constitutional right to opt out. Rather, this Comment maintains simply 
that Meyer and Pierce provide a broad parental right sufficient to adequately plead a hy-
brid claim. This does not mean that a plaintiff would be entitled to an opt-out, but merely 
means that a court would have to conduct a hybrid claim analysis relying on the standard 
articulated in Sherbert and applied to public school curriculum in Mozert. Whether the 
plaintiff would be entitled to an opt-out would depend on the outcome of this analysis.  
 89. While the Smith Court did not specifically state that a hybrid claim would require 
strict scrutiny, a common sense reading of the opinion dictates such a result. In discussing 
the hybrid exception, the Court cited specific examples of the hybrid exception and all of 
the cases cited by the Court involved a strict scrutiny analysis. See Employment Div. v. 
Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881-82 (1990). Moreover, numerous circuit courts have held that the 
hybrid exception enumerated in Smith mandates strict scrutiny. See San Jose Christian 
Coll. v. City of Morgan Hill, 360 F.3d 1024, 1031 (9th Cir. 2004); Civil Liberties for Urban 
Believers v. City of Chicago, 342 F.3d 752, 765 (7th Cir. 2003); Tenafly Eruv Ass’n, Inc. v. 
Borough of Tenafly, 309 F.3d 144, 163 n.20 (3d Cir. 2002).  
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and (2) the government lacks a “compelling state interest” in regulat-
ing burdening activity.90  
 The starting point for this analysis is the Sixth Circuit’s decision in 
Mozert. There, the court held that requiring students to read from a 
textbook containing religiously offensive ideas did not burden the free 
exercise of religion but had merely exposed the plaintiffs to differing 
views of religion.91 In so doing, the court stated, “ ‘[D]istinctions must 
be drawn between those governmental actions that actually interfere 
with the exercise of religion, and those that merely require or result in 
exposure to attitudes and outlooks at odds with perspectives prompted 
by religion.’ ”92 
 The plaintiffs in Mozert were essentially asking for an opt-out of a 
class that taught religiously offensive ideas.93 According to the Moz-
ert court, what is absent in an opt-out situation is “the critical ele-
ment of compulsion to affirm or deny a religious belief or to engage or 
refrain from engaging in a practice forbidden or required in the exer-
cise of a plaintiff’s religion.”94  
 This does not mean, however, that any and all opt-out challenges 
would be invariably denied. To the contrary, a plausible argument 
can be made that the majority in Mozert was incorrect in holding 
that there was no burden on the plaintiffs’ free exercise of religion.95 
In fact, Judge Boggs wrote a separate concurring opinion disagreeing 
with the majority’s holding that the plaintiffs had not shown a bur-
den on their free exercise of religion.  He opined that the majority 
“view both slights plaintiffs’ honest beliefs that studying the full Holt 
series would be conduct contrary to their religion, and overlooks 
other Supreme Court Free Exercise cases which view ‘conduct’ that 
may offend religious exercise at least as broadly as do plaintiffs.”96 
                                                                                                                     
 90. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963).  
 91. Mozert v. Hawkins County Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058, 1068 (6th Cir. 1987). 
 92. Id. (quoting Grove City v. Mead Sch. Dist. No. 354, 753 F.2d 1528, 1543 (9th Cir. 
1985)). 
 93. The plaintiff s were seeking to opt out of the reading period, at which the Holt Se-
ries was being read, and be excused to the library. See id. at 1063.  
 94. Id. at 1069. 
 95. In addition to simply arguing that the majority in Mozert was incorrect, at least 
one commentator has suggested that a class that strictly teaches evolution is distinguish-
able from the facts of Mozert and falls within a “judicially created gray area.” Hodgson, su-
pra note 1, at 180. 
If the Mozert court tells us mere exposure to contrary religious ideas does not 
burden free exercise, and the Court in Barnette and Yoder proscribes mandat-
ing an outward expression of contrary religious beliefs, or a compulsion of be-
havior contrary to one’s religion, then there must be some gray area in between 
the two. Given this framework, teaching the theory of evolution (with no com-
peting theories) as the only scientifically plausible theory of the origins of life 
falls short of Barnette and Yoder but compels much more than Mozert, thus fal-
ling into that judicially created gray area. 
Id. 
 96. Mozert, 827 F.2d at 1075 (Boggs, J., concurring).  
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Judge Boggs noted, “ ‘[R]eligious beliefs need not be acceptable, logi-
cal, consistent, or comprehensible to others in order to merit First 
Amendment protection.’ ”97 Accordingly, Judge Boggs stated that the 
plaintiffs had “drawn their line” as to what was religiously accept-
able and “would [have held] that if they are forced over that line, 
they are ‘engaging in conduct’ forbidden by their religion.”98  
 Judge Boggs based this conclusion on the Supreme Court’s deci-
sion in Thomas v. Review Board.99 Thomas involved a situation 
where the plaintiff quit his job producing turrets for military tanks 
based upon religious reasons.100 Thomas thereafter applied for unem-
ployment benefits but was denied them on the grounds that he had 
no good cause to terminate his employment.101 In addressing Thomas’ 
claim, the Court noted that “a person may not be compelled to choose 
between the exercise of a First Amendment right and participation in 
an otherwise available public program.”102 The Court conceded that 
the Indiana law did not compel a violation of conscience, yet “ ‘this is 
only the beginning, not the end, of [the] inquiry.’ ”103 The Court held 
that when the state conditions receipt of an important benefit on 
conduct prohibited by a religious faith, “thereby putting substantial 
pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior and to violate his be-
liefs, a burden upon religion exists.”104 In remarking on the Thomas 
holding, Judge Boggs in Mozert correctly noted:  
For Thomas, there was no commandment against hooking up 
chains. He asserted that this would be “aiding in the manufacture 
of items used in the advancement of war,” because it was in a tank 
turret line, but he had also said that he would work in a steel fac-
tory that might ultimately sell to the military. . . . This distinction 
appears as convoluted as [the Mozert] plaintiffs’ distinctions seem 
to some. Nevertheless, Thomas drew his line, and the Supreme 
Court respected it and dealt with it.105 
 Judge Boggs, however, ultimately concluded that the plaintiffs 
were not entitled to an opt-out, arguing that the principle enumer-
ated in Sherbert was “sufficiently thin” and “should not be extended 
blindly.”106 For Judge Boggs, the nature of the school system and the 
                                                                                                                     
 97. Id. at 1076 (alteration in original) (citing Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 714 
(1981)). 
 98. Id.  
 99. 450 U.S. 707. 
 100. Id. at 712. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. at 716.  
 103. Id. at 717 (quoting Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 393, 404 (1963)). 
 104. Id. at 717-18. 
 105. Mozert v. Hawkins County Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058, 1076 (6th Cir. 1987) (cit-
ing Thomas, 450 U.S. at 712 n.4).  
 106. Id. at 1079. 
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burden an opt-out would place upon a school dictated that Sherbert 
not be extended to cover that situation:  
Running a public school system of today’s magnitude is quite a dif-
ferent proposition. A constitutional challenge to the content of in-
struction (as opposed to participation in ritual such as magic 
chants, or prayers) is a challenge to the notion of a politically-
controlled school system. Imposing on school boards the delicate 
task of satisfying the “compelling interest” test to justify failure to 
accommodate pupils is a significant step. It is a substantial impo-
sition on the schools to require them to justify each instance of not 
dealing with students’ individual, religiously compelled, objections 
(as opposed to permitting a local, rough and ready, adjustment), 
and I do not see that the Supreme Court has authorized us to 
make such a requirement.107 
 Judge Boggs’ argument seems sound, and would foreclose most 
opt-out requests—certainly  all requests as burdensome as the one in 
Mozert. However, Judge Boggs seems to suggest that the Sherbert 
analysis should never been applied in the context of public school 
curricula. While it is a compelling argument under the facts of Moz-
ert, its appeal would not be as strong under a different set of facts. 
For instance, suppose a parent requested an opt-out of merely a four-
week period of a biology class during which the theory of evolution 
was taught. This is a much narrower opt-out request, and its compli-
ance would be much less burdensome on the school. As such, it would 
seem entirely reasonable to extend the Sherbert compelling interest 
test to this situation.  
 If Sherbert were to be applied to such a scenario, a plaintiff would 
almost certainly prevail. Judge Boggs conceded that a burden had 
been shown in Mozert and, in fact, stated, “the burden in our case is 
greater than in . . . Sherbert.”108 Accordingly, with the first prong of 
Sherbert present, the burden would then move to the state to come 
forth with a compelling interest as to why the burdensome action 
should be permitted to stand. The compelling interest test is “quite 
strict” such that “ ‘[o]nly the gravest abuses, endangering paramount 
interests, give occasion for permissible limitation.’ ”109 In the context 
of an opt-out request, it would be necessary to show actual problems 
with the accommodation provided; otherwise, “it is difficult to see 
how this standard could be met if a constitutional burden were estab-
lished.”110 Moreover, it seems unlikely that a state would be able to 
                                                                                                                     
 107. Id. at 1079-80 (footnotes omitted).  
 108. Id. at 1079 (“Here, the burden is many years of education, being required to study 
books that, in plaintiffs’ view, systematically undervalue, contradict and ignore their religion.”).  
 109. Id. at 1077 (citing Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963) (quoting Thomas 
v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945)) (alteration in original). 
 110. Id. at 1078.  
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show a problem with the accommodation under a narrow opt-out re-
quest.111 Excusing a student from four weeks of biology hardly seems 
to rise to the level of a grave abuse that would “endanger[ ]  para-
mount interests.”112 
 Nevertheless, a hybrid claim seeking an opt-out of a public school 
curriculum would be unlikely to prevail. No court has been inclined 
to grant an opt-out; moreover, no court has been persuaded that 
Meyer and Pierce provide a broad parental right sufficient to conduct 
a hybrid analysis. Even if a court were persuaded to conduct a hybrid 
analysis, the Mozert decision would foreclose opt-outs in almost all 
but the narrowest of circumstances. Thus, for a hybrid claim to suc-
ceed, a plaintiff would first have to convince a court that Meyer and 
Pierce provide a broad parental right and then show the court that 
the opt-out he or she is requesting is very narrow in scope, such that 
a Sherbert analysis should be conducted.  
C.   RFRA Claims 
1. The RFRA Standard  
 In addition to the constitutional claims enumerated above, plain-
tiffs seeking an opt-out from religiously offensive public school cur-
ricula also have a statutory claim under state Religious and Freedom 
Restoration Acts (RFRAs). Although the federal RFRA is unconstitu-
tional as applied to the states after City of Boerne v. Flores,113 a num-
ber of states have enacted a similar RFRA statute.114 Likewise, courts 
                                                                                                                     
 111. It should be noted, however, that such a request could be seen as burdensome in 
two respects. First, the obligation on the part of the school to consider the opt-out request 
may, in and of itself, be a burden. If one student is permitted to opt out of a portion of the 
curriculum, then other students may be permitted to do so for other reasons. This would 
force the school board to undertake a case-by-case analysis to determine if the opt-out re-
quest is valid and should be granted. Second, it is now common for many school boards to 
require that students pass a standardized achievement test prior to graduation. If a stu-
dent were permitted to opt out of a biology part of the curriculum, it would then be logical 
to allow the student to opt out of the biology portion of the standardized test. This could 
create problems much larger than the original four-week opt-out of the biology class. The 
outcome of a narrow opt-out case would largely depend on how the school board phrased 
the nature of the burden. If the school board simply maintained that the four-week opt-out 
was, in and of itself, burdensome, the school board would be unlikely to win. However, if 
the school board were to fully articulate the more far-reaching ramifications of permitting 
the opt-out, namely the two issues noted above, it would be a much more difficult case for a 
plaintiff to win.  
 112. See Mozert, 827 F.2d at 1077.  
 113. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 532-36 (1997) (“Broad as the power of Con-
gress is under the Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, RFRA contradicts 
vital principles necessary to maintain separation of powers and the federal balance.”).  
 114. Michael E. Lechliter, Note, The Free Exercise of Religion and Public Schools: The 
Implications of Hybrid Rights on the Religious Upbringing of Children, 103 MICH. L. REV. 
2209, 2213 n.31 (2005) (“The language of state RFRAs is similar to the original federal 
RFRA in that they typically require that the government follow a compelling state inter-
est/least restrictive means standard.” (citing ALA. CONST. of 1901, amend. 622 (1999)). 
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in a number of states have interpreted their state constitutions to re-
quire a strict scrutiny test for religious freedom.115 However, the ma-
jority of states has not adopted a RFRA similar to that of the federal 
RFRA, nor have courts in these states interpreted their state consti-
tutions as requiring strict scrutiny.116 In these states, parents would 
be forced to rely on the hybrid claim.  
 The typical state RFRA applying strict scrutiny provides:  
(1) The government shall not substantially burden a person’s exer-
cise of religion, even if the burden results from a rule of general 
applicability, except that government may substantially burden a 
person’s exercise of religion only if it demonstrates that application 
of the burden to the person: 
(a) Is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and 
(b) Is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling gov-
ernmental interest.117 
Such statutes effectively overturn the Smith decision and reinstate the 
Sherbert standard. This is extremely beneficial for two reasons. First, 
it forces the government to meet a higher standard—one more likely to 
provide plaintiffs with an opt-out. Second, while the state RFRA would 
likely result in the same outcome as a successful hybrid claim, a state 
RFRA claim provides less hurdles for a successful plaintiff to clear. For 
instance, plaintiffs in this context would not be forced to first establish 
that Meyer and Pierce provide the type of broad parental right enti-
tling the action to strict scrutiny. As noted above, the circuit courts 
have been reluctant to find that Meyer and Pierce provide such a broad 
right. Moreover, in the hybrid context it could be difficult to convince a 
court that the strict scrutiny test in Sherbert should be applied in the 
context of public school curricula. By contrast, the RFRA strict scru-
tiny standard undoubtedly applies across the board. Thus, the RFRA 
action is less difficult for a plaintiff to successfully plead and still pro-
vides a strict scrutiny level of analysis. 
 To establish a claim under RFRA, the interference with the plain-
tiff’s religious practice must be more than an inconvenience and rise to 
                                                                                                                     
 115. Id. at 2213-14 (citing State v. Miller, 549 N.W.2d 235, 240-41 (Wis. 1996); Att’y 
Gen. v. Desilets, 636 N.E.2d 233, 236 (Mass. 1994); Hill-Murray Fed’n of Teachers v. Hill-
Murray High Sch., 487 N.W.2d 857, 865 (Minn. 1992)).  
 116. Id. at 2214. These states are Alaska, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Delaware, 
Georgia, Hawaii, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Michi-
gan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, 
New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, 
Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming. Id. at 2214 n.33. 
 117. FLA. STAT. § 761.03(1)(a)-(b) (2005). All state RFRAs are essentially identical in 
content. This Comment will proceed by using Florida’s RFRA as an example.  
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the level of a substantial burden.118 To show a substantial burden under 
RFRA, the plaintiff must show that the government regulation is one 
that either compels the plaintiff to engage in conduct that his religion 
forbids or forbids him to engage in conduct that his religion requires.119  
2.   Applying the RFRA Standard to Public School Curricula  
 While very few cases have addressed a RFRA claim seeking an 
opt-out of public school curricula, a federal district court did confront 
this issue under the federal RFRA before it was held unconstitu-
tional by the Supreme Court in Boerne.120 In Battles v. Anne Arundel 
County Board of Education,121 the court addressed a Maryland law 
regulating home schooling of children.122 The law required “instruc-
tion in English, mathematics, science, social studies, art, music, 
health, and physical education.”123 To ensure that instruction was 
provided in these areas, the law required parents to “maintain a 
portfolio of instructional materials and examples of the child’s work . 
. . permit a representative to observe the teaching provided and re-
view the portfolio at a mutually agreeable time and place not more 
than three times a year.”124 Battles refused to comply with the law, 
claiming that it violated the free exercise of religion protected by the 
federal RFRA.125 Battles was attempting to opt out of this curricu-
lum, claiming “that the public school system indoctrinates children in 
atheism, non-Christian religions, secular humanism, evolutionism 
and other teachings which are contrary to her religious beliefs.”126 
 In addressing the RFRA claim, the court held that the allegations 
“that the required curriculum promotes atheism, paganism, and evolu-
tionism” were not sufficient to establish a substantial burden on the 
free exercise of religion.127 According to the court, the plaintiffs did “not 
have to alter their religious beliefs or forego acts necessary to their be-
                                                                                                                     
 118. First Baptist Church of Perrine v. Miami-Dade County, 768 So. 2d 1114, 1117 n.3 
(Fla. 3d DCA 2000). 
 119. Warner v. City of Boca Raton, 887 So. 2d 1023, 1033 (Fla. 2004).  
 120. Cases applying the federal RFRA are relevant because the federal RFRA is nearly 
identical to the state RFRAs that impose strict scrutiny.  The federal RFRA provides that 
“government shall not substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion even if the bur-
den results from a rule of general applicability” unless the Government “demonstrates that 
application of the burden . . . (1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; 
and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.” 
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a)-(b) (1994). 
 121. 904 F. Supp. 471 (D. Md. 1995).  
 122. Id. at 472.  
 123. Id. at 473.  
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. at 476.  
 126. Id. at 472. 
 127. Id. at 477. 
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liefs to comply with Maryland’s monitoring requirements.”128 As such, 
the court held that there was no free exercise violation.129 
 The Battles decision, however, is not dispositive for a variety of 
reasons. First, the opt-out request in Battles was extremely broad 
and overly burdensome on the state. A court may view a case pre-
senting a narrower opt-out request more favorably. Second, and more 
importantly, the Battles decision ignores Supreme Court precedent 
regarding burdens on the free exercise of religion. As the Thomas 
Court indicated, a government regulation that compels an affirmance 
or denial of a religious belief is not always necessary to find a burden 
on the free exercise of religion. Rather, such an inquiry is “only the 
beginning, not the end,” of the analysis.130 In fact, the state cannot 
require a person to choose between an otherwise public program and 
a religious belief.131 Were a state to condition an important benefit 
upon conduct prohibited by a religious belief, this compulsion, while 
indirect, would “nonetheless [be] substantial.”132 
 Public education is certainly a “public program” providing an “im-
portant benefit.” As such, the state may not condition this right upon 
conduct prohibited by a religious belief.133 As Judge Boggs correctly 
noted in Mozert, the plaintiff in Thomas did not adhere to a religion 
that specifically commanded him to refrain from producing weapons 
used for war, yet he fully believed that his religion prohibited this 
type of conduct.134 Likewise, plaintiffs seeking to opt out of a class 
teaching evolution does not do so based on a specific commandment 
prohibiting them from learning the theory of evolution. Yet, such a 
situation burdens the free exercise of their religion because the the-
ory of evolution denies the literal truth of the Bible, something fun-
damentalist believers adhere to. According to Judge Boggs, once 
plaintiffs have “drawn their line” as to what is religiously acceptable 
and “are forced over that line, they are ‘engaging in conduct’ forbid-
den by their religion.”135 Assuming a court was persuaded by this ar-
gument, a plaintiff could potentially win a state RFRA claim seeking 
to opt out of a public school curriculum.  
 If a court were to grant an opt-out, the question would be whether 
that action violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amend-
ment. The remainder of this Comment addresses that issue.  
                                                                                                                     
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 717 (1981) (quoting Sherbert v. Verner, 374 
U.S. 398, 403-04 (1963)).  
 131. Id. at 716.  
 132. Id. at 717-18.  
 133. See id. at 716-18. 
 134. Mozert v. Hawkins County Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058, 1076 (6th Cir. 1987) 
(Boggs, J., concurring). 
 135. Id.   
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III.   THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE 
A.   The Establishment Clause Standard 
 The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, made appli-
cable to the States by incorporation into the Fourteenth Amend-
ment,136 provides that “Congress shall make no law respecting an es-
tablishment of religion . . . .”137 The Supreme Court has articulated a 
variety of Establishment Clause tests and has resisted confining 
such analyses to “any single test or criterion.”138 To the extent the 
Court has attempted to advance an analytical framework for assess-
ing Establishment Clause cases, its efforts have proven ineffective.139 
In fact, several Justices have repeatedly directed harsh criticism to-
wards the Court’s Establishment Clause standard. Justice Thomas 
stated that “the Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence is in 
hopeless disarray,”140 while Justice Kennedy has proclaimed it in 
need of “[s]ubstantial revision.”141 Nonetheless, there are at least four 
main frameworks of analysis: (1) the Lemon test,142 (2) the endorse-
ment test,143 (3) the coercion test,144 and (4) the neutrality test.145 
 The starting point for any Establishment Clause analysis is un-
doubtedly the Supreme Court’s decision in Lemon v. Kurtzman.146 
The Lemon test states that government action does not violate the 
Establishment Clause so long as it (1) has a secular purpose, (2) does 
not have the principal or primary effect of advancing or inhibiting re-
ligion, and (3) does not foster an excessive entanglement between 
government and religion.147 However, both Justices and academics 
                                                                                                                     
 136. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947).  
 137. U.S. CONST. amend. I (emphasis added).  
 138. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 678-79 (1984).  
 139.  Bauchman v. W. High Sch., 132 F.3d 542, 551 (10th Cir. 1997); see also Michael 
M. Maddigan, The Establishment Clause, Civil Religion, and the Public Church, 81 CAL. L. 
REV. 293, 301 (1993) (describing the endorsement test as an ineffective guide to the Court 
in Establishment Clause cases); Nancy E. Drane, Comment, The Supreme Court’s Missed 
Opportunity: The Constitutionality of Student-Led Graduation Prayer in Light of the 
Crumbling Wall Between Church and State, 31 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 497, 511 (2000) (“Subse-
quent application of the various Establishment Clause tests proved to be as ineffective and 
uneven as the use of the Lemon test.”); Bryan D. LeMoine, Note, Changing Interpretations 
of the Establishment Clause: Financial Support of Religious Schools, 64 MO. L. REV.  709, 
733 (1999) (describing the Lemon test as ineffective). 
 140. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 861 (1995) 
(Thomas, J., concurring).  
 141. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 656 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring 
in part and dissenting in part).  
 142. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).  
 143. See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 687-94 (O’Connor, J., concurring).  
 144. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 592 (1992).  
 145. See McCreary County v. ACLU, 125 S. Ct. 2722, 2733 (2005). 
 146. 403 U.S. 602.  
 147. Id. at 612-13.  
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have repeatedly attacked the Lemon test.148 It was this criticism of 
Lemon that led Justice O’Connor to write a concurring opinion in 
Lynch v. Donnelly,149 arguing that the Lemon test should be refined 
to focus more on whether the government is “endorsing” religion.150 
 Justice O’Connor’s endorsement analysis states that the govern-
ment impermissibly endorses religion if its conduct has either (1) the 
purpose or (2) the effect of conveying that “religion or a particular reli-
gious belief is favored or preferred.”151 The purpose prong asks whether 
the government intended to “endorse or disapprove of religion.”152 Con-
versely, the effect prong asks whether a “reasonable observer,” famil-
iar with the history and context of the community, would view the 
government conduct as communicating a message of endorsement or 
disapproval.153 Some courts and commentators have accepted Justice 
O’Connor’s endorsement test “as the controlling analytical framework 
for evaluating Establishment Clause claims.”154 The Supreme Court, 
however, has not been unanimous in its adoption of the endorsement 
test.155 In fact, “even the Justices who have adopted the endorsement 
test do not agree on how it should be applied.”156  
                                                                                                                     
 148. See, e.g., County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 655 (1989) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stating that the Court should not advocate or 
adopt the Lemon test as the primary guide for resolving difficult Establishment Clause is-
sues); Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 33 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating 
that use of Lemon test to deny tax exemption was not founded on the Constitution, prece-
dent, or history); Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 639-40 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(criticizing inconsistent application of the Lemon test); Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 419 
(1985) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (stating that the Lemon test is too formalistic); Wallace v. 
Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 112 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (stating that Lemon test is 
“blurred” and “indistinct”); Lynch, 465 U.S. at 679 (stating that the Lemon test is not over-
riding criteria); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 394 (1983) (stating that the Lemon test is 
nothing but a “helpful signpost”); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 792-95 (1983) (ignor-
ing the Lemon test in favor of historical argument); see also Stuart W. Bowen, Jr., Com-
ment, Is Lemon a Lemon? Crosscurrents in Contemporary Establishment Clause Jurispru-
dence, 22 ST. MARY’S L.J. 129, 134 (1990) (“[T]he Court should clarify its [Establishment 
Clause] analysis by abandoning Lemon and adopting a test that more accurately reflects 
the framers’ original understanding of the word ‘establishment.’ ”). 
 149. 465 U.S. 668. 
 150. Id. at 687-94 (O’Connor, J., concurring).  
 151. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 592-93 (citations omitted); see also Lynch, 465 U.S. at 687-
94 (O’Connor, J., concurring).  
 152. Edwards, 482 U.S. at 585 (quoting Lynch, 465 U.S. at 690). 
 153. Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 778-81 (1995) 
(O’Connor, J., concurring).  
 154. Bauchman v. W. High Sch., 132 F.3d 542, 552 (10th Cir. 1997); see also James M. 
Lewis & Michael L. Vild, Note, A Controversial Twist of Lemon: The Endorsement Test as 
the New Establishment Clause Standard, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 671 (1990). 
 155. Bauchman, 132 F.3d at 552.  
 156. Id. For instance, the Court has indicated that the purpose component alone is suf-
ficient to invalidate government action. Edwards, 482 U.S. at 585. Yet, the Court has 
rarely decided cases based solely on the purpose component. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 
U.S. 38, 75 (1985). Additionally, the Court’s willingness to analyze the government’s sub-
jective intent in determining the purpose of the government’s action has been criticized by 
other Justices on the Court. See Edwards, 482 U.S. at 636-37 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stat-
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 In addition to the Lemon and endorsement tests articulated 
above, the Court, in reviewing government action under the Estab-
lishment Clause, has also asked whether the government conduct at 
issue has a coercive effect.157 In Lee v. Weisman, the Court addressed 
whether allowing clerical members to offer prayer as part of a high 
school graduation ceremony was consistent with the religion clauses 
of the First Amendment.158 The Court focused on the coercive nature 
of the prayer, stating “there are heightened concerns with protecting 
freedom of conscience from subtle coercive pressure in the elemen-
tary and secondary public schools.”159 Moreover, “prayer exercises in 
public schools carry a particular risk of indirect coercion.”160 The 
Court held the coercive nature of the prayer did not withstand Estab-
lishment Clause scrutiny.161 In so holding, the Court stated, “[T]he 
school district’s supervision and control of a high school graduation 
ceremony places . . . pressure . . . on attending students to stand as a 
group . . . . This pressure, though subtle and indirect, can be as real 
as any overt compulsion.”162 Thus, another factor to use in analyzing 
government action under the Establishment Clause is the coercive 
nature of the behavior.  
 Lending more confusion to the already cumbersome body of Estab-
lishment Clause jurisprudence is the existence of yet another stan-
dard. In addition to the standards enumerated above, the Court has 
employed a neutrality test in determining whether government ac-
tion violates the Establishment Clause.163 The Court has stated that 
the “First Amendment mandates governmental neutrality between 
religion and religion, and between religion and nonreligion.”164 More-
over, “When the government acts with the ostensible and predomi-
nant purpose of advancing religion, it violates that central Estab-
lishment Clause value of official religious neutrality, there being no 
neutrality when the government’s ostensible object is to take 
sides.”165 The Court has characterized this neutrality principle as 
part of Lemon’s purpose requirement.166  
                                                                                                                     
ing that determining the government’s subjective intent is “almost always an impossible 
task” and looking “for the sole purpose of even a single legislator is probably to look for 
something that does not exist”).  
 157. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 592 (1992). 
 158. Id. at 580.  
 159. Id. at 592.  
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. at 599.  
 162. Id. at 593.  
 163. McCreary County v. ACLU, 125 S. Ct. 2722, 2733 (2005).  
 164. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968).  
 165. McCreary County, 125 S. Ct. at 2733.  
 166. Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints 
v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 335 (1987) (“Lemon’s ‘purpose’ requirement aims at preventing the 
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 The question is whether granting an opt-out, as either the result 
of a legal challenge or as a result of the state’s own free decision, 
would be unconstitutional under any of the Establishment Clause 
standards. The next Part addresses that issue.  
B.   Applying the Establishment Clause Standard to Public School 
Curricula Opt-Outs 
 The few courts that have addressed the constitutionality of pro-
viding an opt-out or other religious accommodation have generally 
concluded that such practice does not violate the Establishment 
Clause. For instance, after granting the accommodation in Sherbert, 
the Court summarily dismissed the Establishment Clause problem: 
In holding as we do, plainly we are not fostering the ‘establish-
ment’ of the Seventh-day Adventist religion in South Carolina, for 
the extension of unemployment benefits to Sabbatarians in com-
mon with Sunday worshippers reflects nothing more than the gov-
ernmental obligation of neutrality in the face of religious differ-
ences, and does not represent that involvement of religious with 
secular institutions which it is the object of the Establishment 
Clause to forestall.167 
 Justice Stewart, however, took issue with the majority’s holding. 
While noting that he did not agree with the Court’s Establishment 
Clause jurisprudence, he stated that there are many situations 
where free exercise claims “will run into head-on collision with the 
Court’s insensitive and sterile construction of the Establishment 
Clause.”168 In Justice Stewart’s opinion, Sherbert was “clearly such a 
case.”169 Justice Stewart opined: “[T]he Establishment Clause as con-
strued by this Court not only permits but affirmatively requires 
South Carolina equally to deny the appellant’s claim for unemploy-
ment compensation when her refusal to work on Saturdays is based 
upon her religious creed.”170 
 Sherbert, however, was decided before Lemon, so there is some 
question as to whether the majority’s analysis would be the same af-
ter Lemon. Nevertheless, the Court had the opportunity to address 
that portion of the Sherbert holding post-Lemon and seemed to pass 
on the issue. In Thomas, the Court granted a religious accommoda-
tion and summarily dismissed the Establishment Clause issue by re-
lying on the above quoted passage from Sherbert. In so doing, the 
                                                                                                                     
[government] from abandoning neutrality and acting with the intent of promoting a par-
ticular point of view in religious matters.”).  
 167. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 409 (1963).  
 168. Id. at 414 (Stewart, J., concurring).  
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. at 415. 
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Court stated, “Unless we are prepared to overrule Sherbert, . . . Tho-
mas cannot be denied the benefits due him on the basis of the find-
ing[] . . . that he terminated his employment because of his religious 
convictions.”171 The Court apparently was not prepared to overrule 
Sherbert, thereby paying scant attention to the Establishment 
Clause problem. Justice Rehnquist dissented, arguing that to ac-
commodate Thomas would be to violate the Court’s Establishment 
Clause cases, and in particular, Lemon.172  In noting the conflict be-
tween Sherbert and Lemon, Justice Rehnquist opined, “To the extent 
Sherbert was correctly decided, it might be argued that cases such as 
. . . Lemon . . . were wrongly decided.”173 
 Justices Stewart and Rehnquist make valid points. Under a strict 
interpretation of the Establishment Clause standards, providing a 
religious accommodation, such as a public school curriculum opt-out, 
would likely be unconstitutional. For instance, under a Lemon analy-
sis, the opt-out would likely fail the secular purpose prong, as it is 
hard to imagine any secular purpose for providing an opt-out. In fact, 
granting the opt-out inhibits the school’s secular purpose of teaching 
evolution and has the primary effect of advancing religion. Such ac-
tion sends the signal that being of a particular religious belief is a fa-
vorable thing as it can excuse one from class.  
 Likewise, under the endorsement analysis the opt-out would 
likely fail the purpose and effect prong because, as noted above, it 
sends the message that “religion or a particular religious belief is fa-
vored or preferred.”174 This is true because adherents of religious be-
liefs that are not opposed to the theory of evolution would not be 
granted an opt-out. For this same reason, such an opt-out would vio-
late the neutrality test because the “First Amendment mandates 
governmental neutrality between religion and religion.”175 Such an 
opt-out favors those adherents who believe in a literal interpretation 
of the Bible to the exclusion of those who do not. This action is clearly 
not neutral towards religion. Additionally, it could also be argued 
that such opt-outs violate the coercion analysis for similar reasons. 
                                                                                                                     
 171. Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 720 (1981). 
 172. Id. at 726 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist stated:  
It is not surprising that the Court today makes no attempt to apply [the 
Lemon] principles to the facts of this case. If Indiana were to legislate what the 
Court today requires—an unemployment compensation law which permitted 
benefits to be granted to those persons who quit their jobs for religious rea-
sons—the statute would “plainly” violate the Establishment Clause as inter-
preted in such cases as Lemon . . . .  
Id. 
 173. Id. at 724 n.2.  
 174. See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 593 (1989) (quoting Wallace v. 
Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 70 (1985)); see also Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687-94 (1984) 
(O’Connor, J., concurring).  
 175. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968).  
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While there is no direct compulsion, the message that a particular re-
ligious belief will receive favorable treatment seems to exhibit the 
same type of subtle coercion the Court was concerned with in Lee.176 
 Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has continuously held that reli-
gious accommodations do not violate the Establishment Clause.177 
The Court “has long recognized that the government may . . . ac-
commodate religious practices . . . without violating the Establish-
ment Clause.”178 A strict interpretation of Establishment Clause ju-
risprudence would lead to invalidation of religious accommodations, 
yet the Court seems to apply a less stringent Establishment Clause 
standard in this area. In the recent case of Locke v. Davey,179 the 
Court noted the tension between the two clauses but “reaffirmed that 
‘there is room for play in the joints between’ the Free Exercise and 
Establishment Clauses, allowing the government to accommodate re-
ligion beyond free exercise requirements, without offense to the Es-
tablishment Clause.”180 Although, the Court has conceded, “[a]t some 
point, accommodation may devolve into ‘an unlawful fostering of re-
ligion.’ ”181 However, based on the accommodation programs the 
Court has previously upheld, it is difficult to see how the Court could 
find a narrow public school curriculum opt-out as violative of the Es-
tablishment Clause.182 
C.   Conflict Between Free Exercise Rights and the Establishment 
Clause 
 To the extent that an opt-out is regarded as required under a free 
exercise, hybrid, or RFRA analysis and further, to the extent that an 
opt-out is regarded as prohibited under the Establishment Clause, 
the question becomes: Which right trumps? Which right is more im-
                                                                                                                     
 176. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 592 (1992).  
 177. See Michael W. McConnell, The Problem of Singling Out Religion, 50 DEPAUL L. 
REV. 1, 5 (2000) (“The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that religious accommodations 
are constitutionally permissible.”). But cf. William P. Marshall, In Defense of Smith and 
Free Exercise Revisionism, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 308, 320 (1991) (arguing religious exemptions 
are problematic under the Establishment Clause). 
 178. Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n, 480 U.S. 136, 144-45 (1987).  
 179. 540 U.S. 712 (2004).  
 180. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 125 S. Ct. 2113, 2117 (2005) (quoting Davey, 540 U.S. at 718); 
see also Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970). 
 181. Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints 
v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 334-35 (1987) (quoting Hobbie, 480 U.S. at 145). 
 182. See, e.g., Cutter, 125 S. Ct. at 2117 (upholding Religious Land Use and Institu-
tionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1 (2000)); Hobbie, 480 U.S. at 144-45 
(granting an unemployment compensation religious accommodation); Thomas v. Review 
Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 720 (1981) (same); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (granting ex-
emption from compulsory school attendance law to Amish children); Walz, 397 U.S. at 674 
(upholding a statute providing tax exemption to religious organizations); Sherbert v. 
Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 409 (1963) (granting an unemployment compensation religious ac-
commodation).  
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portant? Numerous scholars and judges have recognized and dis-
cussed the conflict between the religion clauses of the First Amend-
ment.183 “The Court has struggled to find a neutral course between 
the two Religion Clauses, both of which are cast in absolute terms, 
and either of which, if expanded to a logical extreme, would tend to 
clash with the other.”184 While the Court has struggled to find a neu-
tral course between the two clauses, the Court has nevertheless 
made it clear that the rights enumerated in the Free Exercise Clause 
do not supersede the limitations imposed by the Establishment 
Clause: “The principle that government may accommodate the free 
exercise of religion does not supersede the fundamental limitations 
imposed by the Establishment Clause.”185  
 While the Court has acknowledged that the Free Exercise Clause 
does not supersede the Establishment Clause, the Court has also 
stated “that ‘there is room for play in the joints between’ the Free 
Exercise and Establishment Clauses, allowing the government to ac-
commodate religion beyond free exercise requirements, without of-
fense to the Establishment Clause.”186 Moreover, the Court has con-
tinuously permitted religious accommodations despite the fact that, 
under a strict interpretation of Establishment Clause jurisprudence, 
such accommodations would seem to be unconstitutional.  
 To the extent that a court determines it violates the Establish-
ment Clause to provide an opt-out, one may not be provided no mat-
ter how a court decides the free exercise claim. Nevertheless, the 
Court has repeatedly upheld religious accommodations187 and has, in 
fact, employed a less strenuous Establishment Clause test when 
scrutinizing religious accommodations.188 Therefore, while strict ad-
herence to the Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence would 
prevent a public school curriculum opt-out, the Court has avoided 
addressing the conflict between the Establishment Clause and the 
Free Exercise Clause head-on by employing a less stringent Estab-
lishment Clause standard to religious accommodations. Ultimately, 
this would allow parents to prevail on a public school curriculum opt-
out challenge despite the fact that there are serious Establishment 
                                                                                                                     
 183. See Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 718 (2004) (“[T]he Establishment Clause and 
the Free Exercise Clause . . . are frequently in tension.”); Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 
455, 469 (1973); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 677 (1971); Walz, 397 U.S. at 668-69; 
see also Emilie Kraft Bindon, Comment, Entangled Choices: Selecting Chaplains for the 
United States Armed Forces, 56 ALA. L. REV. 247, 259 (2004).  
 184. Walz, 397 U.S. at 668-69. 
 185. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992) (emphasis added).  
 186. Cutter, 125 S. Ct. at 2117 (quoting Davey, 540 U.S. at 718); see also Walz, 397 U.S. 
at 669. 
 187. Hobbie, 480 U.S. at 144-45 (stating that the Court “has long recognized that the 
government may . . . accommodate religious practices . . . without violating the Establish-
ment Clause”). 
 188. See cases cited supra note 182. 
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Clause problems inherent in granting such an accommodation and 
despite the fact that the Free Exercise Clause does not supersede the 
Establishment Clause.  
IV.   CONCLUSION 
 Opting out of public school curricula on grounds that the curricu-
lum is religiously offensive raises a variety of issues. For instance, 
may parents force school boards to allow their children to opt out of 
certain classes based on a claim of free exercise, whether that claim 
is in the form of a Free Exercise Clause challenge, a hybrid claim 
challenge, or a state RFRA challenge? To the extent that a school 
board is forced to provide an opt-out or provides an opt-out based on 
its own initiative, does such action violate the Establishment Clause? 
To the extent that an opt-out is required based upon free exercise 
principles and to the extent the Establishment Clause prohibits pro-
viding an opt-out, which right prevails?  
 After Smith, any Free Exercise Clause challenge, standing alone, 
would be unsuccessful. However, the hybrid exception to Smith 
would provide some likelihood of success. Nevertheless, courts have 
been extremely reluctant to apply Smith’s hybrid exception and have 
been even more reluctant to provide religious accommodations in the 
realm of public schools. State RFRAs would provide parents with the 
most likelihood for success; however, only a handful of states have 
adopted a RFRA that provides for strict scrutiny. Additionally, as 
with hybrid claims, courts have been reluctant to interfere in the 
functions of public education. As such, courts have gone out of their 
way to hold that no burden on the free exercise of religion exists in 
order to avoid imposing burdens on the schools that would result 
from curriculum opt-outs. If an opt-out claim were to succeed, it 
would likely be a very narrow opt-out. A narrow opt-out would im-
pose only a minimal burden on the school and would alleviate many 
of the concerns expressed by the courts considering curriculum opt-
outs. 
 In addition, granting an opt-out raises Establishment Clause con-
cerns. Moreover, the Court has acknowledged that the Free Exercise 
Clause does not supersede the Establishment Clause. Therefore, to 
the extent that a court were to determine that an opt-out violated the 
Establishment Clause, one may not be provided no matter how the 
court determined the free exercise claim. Nevertheless, the Court has 
repeatedly upheld religious accommodations despite the fact that 
such accommodations seem to be unconstitutional under a strict in-
terpretation of Establishment Clause jurisprudence.  
 While courts have been reluctant to grant curriculum opt-outs, it 
seems plausible that a court would grant a narrow opt-out. Due to 
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the Court’s willingness to apply a less stringent Establishment 
Clause standard to religious accommodations, an opt-out would 
unlikely be found violative of the Establishment Clause. Thus, a nar-
row opt-out would be both likely to prevail based on notions of free 
exercise, whether it is via a hybrid claim or via a state RFRA action, 
and unlikely to be prohibited based on the Establishment Clause. 
 
